Hydraulic Fracturing: The Stealthy Subsurface Trespass by Ragsdale, Terry D.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 28 
Issue 3 Mineral Law Symposium 
Spring 1993 
Hydraulic Fracturing: The Stealthy Subsurface Trespass 
Terry D. Ragsdale 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Terry D. Ragsdale, Hydraulic Fracturing: The Stealthy Subsurface Trespass, 28 Tulsa L. J. 311 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol28/iss3/1 
This Legal Scholarship Symposia Articles is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For 
more information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Volume 28 Spring 1993 Number 3
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: THE STEALTHY
SUBSURFACE TRESPASS*
Terry D. Ragsdalet
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................... 312
II. THEORIES OF OWNERSHIP OF OIL AND GAS RIGHTS ....... 313
A. The Ad Coelum Doctrine .............................. 313
B. The Rule of Capture ................................... 313
C. Nonownership Theory .................................. 314
D. Ownership in Place Theory ............................. 314
E. Consequences of the Theory of Ownership: The
Corporeal-Incorporeal Distinction ....................... 315
III. THEORIES OF LIABILITY FOR SUBSURFACE ENTRY ......... 316
A. Subsurface Trespass ................................... 317
1. Directional Well Subsurface Trespass ............... 317
a. History of Directional Well Subsurface Trespass .. 318
b. Case Law in Ownership in Place Jurisdictions .... 320
c. Case Law in Nonownership Jurisdictions ......... 327
2. Injected Fluids Subsurface Trespass ................. 335
3. Hydraulic Fracture Subsurface Trespass ............ 338
B. Other Theories ......................................... 344
1. Conversion ........................................ 344
* Copyright © 1993 by Terry D. Ragsdale.
t Associate, Gable & Gotwals, Tulsa, Oklahoma. B.S., 1984, University of Tulsa; J.D., 1992,
Southern Methodist University School of Law; Registered Professional Engineer, Louisiana. The
author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Professor John S. Lowe and Teresa B. Adwan.
1
Ragsdale: Hydraulic Fracturing: The Stealthy Subsurface Trespass
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1992
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
2. Private Nuisance ................................... 345
3. Negligence ......................................... 346
IV. CONCLUSION .............................................. 346
I. INTRODUCTION
Standing atop a hill, a farmer gazed suspiciously at his neighbor's
640-acre tract of land where a parade of noisy, diesel-powered vehicles
had been neatly positioned around the well site of the newly drilled well
over a half mile away. Based on his familiarity with farming equipment,
the farmer surmised that a half dozen of the trucks contained large die-
sel-driven pumps. The farmer was puzzled, however, to see two dozen
vehicles that looked like railroad boxcars. Additionally, a mobile home
had been strategically placed such that a person could peer out the win-
dow and have a clear view of the pump trucks and the wellhead. Groups
of hard-hatted workers with sledge hammers were connecting heavy
pieces of steel pipe in a maze that linked the pump trucks, some of the
"boxcars," and the wellhead. Little did the farmer realize, as the diesel
engines on the pump trucks strained to their limits, that solid particles
suspended in a gelled fluid were extending out from the wellbore through
hydraulically created fractures in the reservoir rock, some two miles be-
neath the ground. The farmer would have been even more surprised to
learn that one wing of the fracture even extended into the subsurface
beneath his property. After the "frac" job, natural gas situated beneath
his property would be drawn into the fracture, which was propped open
by the solid particles, and would travel some 3,000 feet to the well on his
neighbor's land.
This article focuses on whether a subsurface entry into an offsetting
property, such as the hydraulic fracture operation described above, con-
stitutes an actionable tort. Prior to determining whether tort action
might be available, theories of mineral interest ownership advanced by
various jurisdictions will be summarized. Second, the feasibility of sev-
eral potential causes of action will be analyzed: subsurface trespass; con-
version; private nuisance; and negligence. Third, case law treatment of
these theories of liability in the context of subsurface entries may shed
some light on the different ways courts in various jurisdictions might an-
alyze a subsurface entry arising from a hydraulic fracture operation.
Fourth, potential plaintiffs and potential defendants will be identified.
Fifth, defenses to the various theories will be explored, including public
policy and statutes of limitations. Finally, a measure of damages for each
theory of liability will be discussed.
[Vol. 28:311
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II. THEORIES OF OWNERSHIP OF OIL AND GAS RIGHTS
A. The Ad Coelum Doctrine
Prior to the advent of the modem commercial oil and gas industry
in 1859,1 the common law phrase "cujus est solum ejus est usque ad
coelum et ad inferos" evidenced the view that ownership of the surface
extended upwards to the heavens and downwards to the center of the
earth.2 Courts soon discovered that the fugacious nature of oil and gas
made strict application of the ad coelum doctrine impractical. Applica-
tion of the traditional ad coelum doctrine in the oil and gas context
would have obstructed development of an important natural resource by
subjecting producers to liability for draining oil and gas from offsetting
properties.3 For this reason, courts developed the "rule of capture."
B. The Rule of Capture
In Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co.4 the Texas Supreme Court described
the rule of capture:
[C]ourts generally have come to recognize that oil and gas, as com-
monly found in underground reservoirs, are securely entrapped in a
static condition in the original pool, and, ordinarily, so remain until
disturbed by penetrations from the surface. It is further established,
nevertheless, that these minerals will migrate across property lines to-
wards any low pressure area created by production from the common
pool. This migratory character of oil and gas has given rise to the so-
called rule or law of capture. That rule simply is that the owner of a
tract of land acquires title to the oil or gas which he produces from
wells on his land, though part of the oil or gas may have migrated from
adjoining lands. He may thus appropriate the oil and gas that have
flowed from adjacent lands without the consent of the owner of those
lands, and without incurring liability to him for drainage.5
1. The first modem commercial oil well was drilled at Titusville, Pennsylvania in 1859. JOHN
S. LOWE, OIL AND GAs LAW 8 (2d ed. 1988).
2. See generally Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Distinguishing Trespass and Nuisance: A Journey
Through a Shifting Borderland, 44 OKLA. L. RV. 227, 235-38 (1991); LOWE, supra note 1, at 8;
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 378 (6th ed. 1990).
3. See generally LOWE, supra note 1, at 8-9. Even if courts had been disposed to strictly apply
the ad coelum doctrine to the fledgling petroleum industry, the rudimentary nature of the petroleum
engineering discipline at that time prevented accurate estimates of the amount of drainage. Id.
4. 210 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1948).
5. Id. at 561-62. This statement of the rule of capture is generally in accord with the formula
offered by commentators:
There is no liability for capturing oil and gas that drains from another's lands. The owner
of a tract of land acquires title to the oil and gas that he produces from wells drilled
thereon, though it may be proved that part of such oil and gas migrated from adjoining
lands.
LoWE, supra note 1, at 9.
1993]
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Thus, the rule of capture, a rule of nonliability, addressed the concern
that the ad coelum doctrine would discourage vigorous exploration for
oil and gas resources.
Recognizing that the rule of capture amounted to a major departure
from the common law ad coelum doctrine, courts felt constrained to for-
mulate a persuasive rationale for reconciling traditional ownership con-
cepts and the rule of capture. Efforts to justify the rule of capture gave
rise to the two dominant theories of ownership of oil and gas rights: (1)
the nonownership theory; and (2) the ownership in place theory.6
C. Nonownership Theory
Early courts analogized the law of capture to the law of wild ani-
mals, holding that the owner of oil and gas rights does not actually own
oil and gas until produced (i.e., "captured") from his wellbore.? Thus,
prior to the capture of oil and gas, the mineral interest owner merely held
a right in the nature of a profit a prendre, an exclusive right to explore
and develop the property in order to reduce oil and gas to possession.8
Jurisdictions adhering to this nonownership theory include California,
Louisiana, and Oklahoma. 9
D. Ownership in Place Theory
In other jurisdictions, courts were reticent to wholly depart from the
ad coelum doctrine. These courts, adhering to the ad coelum doctrine,
6. LOWE, supra note 1, at 29. Other commentators have advanced as many as four theories of
ownership of oil and gas rights: (1) the nonownership theory; (2) the qualified ownership theory; (3)
the ownership in place theory; and (4) the ownership of the strata theory. See generally 1 HOWARD
R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 203, at 31-32 (1991) (including chart of
the view held by particular states). For purposes of this article, the qualified ownership theory will
be considered to be subsumed within the nonownership theory, and the ownership of the strata
theory will be disregarded.
7. Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 18 A. 724 (Pa. 1889); Townsend v.
State, 47 N.E. 19, 21 (Ind. 1897); see also WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 6, § 203.1, at 33; LOWE,
supra note 1, at 29.
8. See, eg., Nunez v. Walnoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So. 2d 955, 962 (La.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
925 (1986). The Louisiana Supreme Court stated that:
"Ownership of land does not include ownership of oil, gas, and other minerals occurring
naturally in liquid or gaseous form, or of any elements or compounds in solution, emulsion,
or association with such minerals. The landowner has the exclusive right to explore and
develop his property for the production of such minerals and to reduce them to possession
and ownership.... 1974 La.Acts No. 50, § 6."
Id. at 962 (quoting 1974 La. Acts No. 50, § 6). See Wright v. Carter Oil Co., 223 P. 835, 836 (Okla.
1923) ("[P]roperty in the oil and gas does not become absolute until they are reduced to actual
possession by being brought to the surface and then controlled.... The right to reduce oil or gas to
possession is a valuable property right."). See also WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 6, § 209, at 96;
LOWE, supra note 1, at 29-30.
9. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 6, § 203, at 32; LOWE, supra note 1, at 30.
[Vol. 28:311
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reasoned that oil and gas are minerals, and, while remaining in the earth,
are part of the realty.1 ° In addition to ownership in place of oil and gas,
the mineral interest owner retained the exclusive right to explore and
develop the property in order to reduce oil and gas to possession.11 Due
to the fugacious nature of oil and gas, however, the courts subjected this
ownership in place of oil and gas to the rule of capture. The Texas
Supreme Court reasoned:
In Texas, and in other jurisdictions, a different rules [sic] exists as
to ownership. In our state the landowner is regarded as having abso-
lute title in severalty to the oil and gas in place beneath his land. The
only qualification of that rule of ownership is that it must be consid-
ered in connection with the law of capture and is subject to police reg-
ulations. The oil and gas beneath the soil are considered a part of the
realty. Each owner of land owns separately, distinctly and exclusively
all the oil and gas under his land....
In addition to Texas, jurisdictions such as Kansas, Mississippi, and New
Mexico have espoused the ownership in place theory, the majority
view.1 3
E. Consequences of the Theory of Ownership: The Corporeal-
Incorporeal Distinction
An important consequence of the theory of ownership relates to the
corporeal-incorporeal distinction. At common law, a corporeal interest
in land included the right of physical possession, whereas an incorporeal
10. See Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 561 (Tex. 1948) ("In our state the land-
owner is regarded as having absolute title in severalty to the oil and gas in place beneath his land....
The oil and gas beneath the soil are considered a part of the realty.") (citations omitted); Bender v.
Brooks, 127 S.W. 168, 170 (Tex. 1910) (" 'Petroleum oil is a mineral, and while in the earth it is part
of the realty .......") (quoting Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 399, 401 (Ohio 1897); see also LOWE,
supra note 1, at 30.
11. Bender, 127 S.W. at 170. The Texas Supreme Court stated:
"Petroleum oil is a mineral, and while in the earth it is part of the realty, and, should it
move from place to place by percolation or otherwise, it forms part of that tract of land in
which it tarries for the time being, and, if it moves to the next adjoining tract, it becomes
part and parcel of that tract, and it forms part of some tract, until it reaches a well and is
raised to the surface, and then for the first time it becomes the subject of distinct ownership
separate from the realty, and becomes personal property, the property of the person into
whose well it came. And this is so whether the oil moves, percolates, or exists in pools or
deposits. In either event, it is property of, and belongs to, the person who reaches it by
means of a well, and severs it from the realty and converts it into personalty." Appellants
[landowners] had the exclusive right as owners of the soil to take oil therefrom ....
Id. (quoting Kelley, 49 N.E. at 401).
12. Elliff, 210 S.W.2d at 561 (citations omitted). Professor Lowe likens oil and gas rights in an
ownership in place jurisdiction to a fee simple absolute estate in the land and a fee simple determina-
ble in the individual oil and gas molecules that terminates upon capture by an offset well. LowE,
supra note 1, at 30.
13. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 6, § 203, at 32.
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right merely included the right to use the land. 4 The mineral interest
owner in a nonownership state merely holds a profit a prendre, an incor-
poreal right to search for and develop oil and gas from the property. 15 It
follows that a landowner in an nonownership state may not sever a sepa-
rate, corporeal estate in oil and gas from the land. In an ownership in
place state, on the other hand, a landowner may sever a distinct corpo-
real interest in the oil and gas from the land.16 Finally, a royalty interest
is properly classified as an incorporeal interest in both nonownership and
ownership in place jurisdictions, since a royalty is a right to oil and gas
when produced, not a right to present possession. 17 Theoretically, at
least, the corporeal-incorporeal distinction should have consequences for
the theories of liability for subsurface trespass.
III. THEORIES OF LIABILITY FOR SUBSURFACE ENTRY
Several potential theories of liability may arise from a subsurface
entry into a neighboring oil or gas formation. These theories of liability
include: (1) subsurface trespass; (2) conversion; (3) private nuisance; and
(4) negligence. 8 While the focus of this article is to analyze potential
theories of liability arising from a subsurface entry by means of a hydrau-
lic fracture, very little case law is directly on point. Thus, theories of
liability will be developed primarily in the context of two historically
common types of subsurface entries: (1) directionally drilled wells; and
(2) fluids injected in enhanced recovery projects. Since a hydraulic frac-
ture is both similar to and different from these two types of subsurface
entries, cases applying various theories of liability in these two contexts
14. LOWE, supra note 1, at 31.
15. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 6, § 209, at 96; Rich v. Doneghey, 177 P. 86, 89 (Okla.
1918).
16. See Humphreys-Mexia Co. v. Gammon, 254 S.W. 296, 299 (Tex. 1923) (severed mineral
interest is a corporeal estate); Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 254 S.W. 290, 292-93
(Tex. 1923) (oil and gas lessee holds a corporeal interest). See generally WILLIAMS & MEYERS,
supra note 6, § 209 (noting that some ownership in place jurisdictions (illogically) do not treat both
the mineral interest and the oil and gas lessee's interest as corporeal interests).
17. LOWE, supra note 1, at 33. A royalty interest is a "right to a share of oil and gas produced
free of costs of production." Id.
18. As the subsurface trespass theory is by far the most popular liability theory in the context of
a subsurface entry, this article will focus primarily on that tort, and other theories of liability will be
summarized briefly. The potential theories of liability analyzed in the text are considered the most
important; however, the list is by no means exhaustive. For example, the equitable action of assump-
sit presumably may be brought against a subsurface trespasser to recover payment under an implied
contract for the right of entry that the subsurface trespasser should have obtained. LOWE, supra
note 1, at 55. Research failed to yield any case law on an assumpsit action against a subsurface
trespasser. Other potential theories of liability include violation of a state conservation order and
intentional interference with contractual relations. Note, Suing a Slant-Driller for Subsurface Tres-
pass or Drainage, 15 STAN. L. REV. 665, 670-73 (1963).
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may be analogized to the hydraulic fracture context.1 9 The analysis of
each theory of liability includes identification of potential plaintiffs and
potential defendants. Additionally, defenses appropriate to each theory
of liability, such as the public policy defense and the statute of limita-
tions, are discussed. Finally, the measure of damages for each theory of
liability is examined.
A. Subsurface Trespass
In modem times, the common law tort of trespass constitutes an
"intentional and unprivileged use or other invasion of another person's
real property."' The trespasser's action must have substantially caused
or permitted the tangible invasion of another person's possessory inter-
ests in real property.21 In the petroleum context, a subsurface trespass
may result from at least three types of subsurface entries into an offset-
ting reservoir: (1) directionally drilled wells; (2) injected fluids in en-
hanced recovery projects; and (3) hydraulic fracture operations. 2
1. Directional Well Subsurface Trespass
Drilling a well that (intentionally or inadvertently) deviates from the
vertical such that the well makes a subsurface crossing of property lines
presents the classical case of subsurface trespass. This subsection will
present the general history of the directional well subsurface trespass and
19. A hydraulic fracture is similar to a directionally drilled well in that both operations artifi-
cially extend laterally from an imaginary vertical line extending from the surface location of the well
through the center of the earth. A hydraulic fracture radically differs from a directional well, how-
ever, in the amount of technical control that an operator can exert over the operations. Modem
drilling technology, including recent advances in the horizontal well context, often permits an opera-
tor to control within a few inches the precise bottom hole location of a directional well. With respect
to a hydraulic fracture, however, an operator may be able to influence the height and length, but the
properties of the reservoir rock primarily control the direction that the fracture extends.
Like many enhanced recovery projects, a hydraulic fracture operation involves the pumping of
fluids down a wellbore and into a formation. Both operations ordinarily require some level of ap-
proval from the state conservation agency. Also, both operations have as their goal the recovery of
oil and gas that might not otherwise be economically recoverable; in conservation parlance, this
translates into the prevention of waste. However, unlike the typical enhanced recovery project, the
fluids pumped in a hydraulic fracture operation contain solid particles, called "proppant," which
hold the fracture open after the fracture fluids are produced back into the injection wellbore. Also,
enhanced recovery injection wells are utilized to sweep hydrocarbons away from the wellbore and
toward a producing wellbore, whereas the same wellbore is used to inject fracture fluids into the
formation and to produce oil and gas from the formation via the fracture conduit.
20. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 227. See generally WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 13 (4th ed. 1971).
21. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 229, 233.
22. Again, these three types of subsurface entries do not exhaust the potential types of subsur-
face trespasses. For example, acid pumped in a well stimulation treatment ostensibly could result in
a subsurface trespass.
7
Ragsdale: Hydraulic Fracturing: The Stealthy Subsurface Trespass
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1992
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
will then examine how both ownership in place jurisdictions and non-
ownership jurisdictions have treated a directional well subsurface
trespass.
a. History of Directional Well Subsurface Trespass
In the infancy of the petroleum industry, oil wells were drilled in
dense geographical patterns throughout an oil field for two reasons.
First, at that time, the rule of capture had not yet been limited by the
promulgation of conservation statutes.23 In this laissezfaire atmosphere,
an owner of oil and gas rights had a major incentive to drill as many
wells as possible on his property: If the owner drilled fewer wells than
his neighbors, oil would be drained from beneath his property. 4 In fact,
the rule of capture encouraged the owner to drill his wells as close as
possible to the property lines. Second, petroleum engineers had not yet
determined that a single, strategically placed well was capable of draining
a reservoir to a large radial extent from the wellbore. In addition to
economic and physical waste, this era of drilling had another unantici-
pated consequence: inadvertent subsurface trespasses.
These inadvertent trespasses resulted from the drilling of wells very
close to property lines. Drillers at that time apparently did not realize
that even a "straight" hole tends to drift as the well is drilled.25 Even
though many wells drilled during that era undoubtedly constituted sub-
surface trespasses, petroleum engineers had no surveying instruments
which could accurately measure the subsurface location of a wellbore.
Thus, the industry operated, for a time, in ignorant bliss of the potential
torts of which many operators were both tortfeasor and victim.
23. Using police power, states have adopted conservation statutes to curb the economic and
physical waste that resulted from unregulated application of the rule of capture. LOWE, supra note
1, at 16-19. Professor Lowe has noted that conservation statutes transformed the rule of capture into
a "fair share" doctrine, under which each owner of oil and gas rights is afforded a reasonable oppor-
tunity to produce his equitable and ratable share of the oil and gas in a common reservoir. Id. at 18;
see also Wronski v. Sun Oil Co., 279 N.W.2d 564 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
24. LOWE, supra note 1, at 15-18.
25. See Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil Co., 16 So. 2d 471 (La. 1943), where the court stated:
It is conceded that during drilling operations some oil and gas wells drilled normally-i.e.,
without effort to direct their downward course--drift or deviate from a vertical or upright
line, and that it frequently happens that a well located on the surface of the owner's land
near to his property line deviates or swings so far away from the vertical that it passes
through, and is bottomed in, his neighbor's property. When this happens, there is a "sub-
surface trespass", whether the deviation is normal or whether it is brought about by inten-
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In the 1930's, however, two technological advances dramatically up-
set the balance.2 6 First, drillers developed downhole tools, such as whip-
stocks, which permitted the drillers to deviate a wellbore toward a
neighboring property line.27 The advent of these crude directional drill-
ing tools tempted scurrilous operators to engage in sneaky, but inten-
tional, subsurface trespasses. Second, during this same time period,
surveying instruments were developed which could measure the direction
and angle of deviation of a wellbore from the vertical. 2 This technologi-
cal advance provided a defense mechanism to landowners suspicious of
questionable drilling practices by neighboring operators. In fact, several
of the cases discussed in this section arise in the context of a landowner
seeking a court order for a subsurface survey of an offset well. 9
The abuses associated with this era effectively ended after the East
Texas Field "slant hole" scandal broke in the 1960's.10 In the aftermath
of that scandal many state conservation agencies began enforcing re-
quirements that operators take and keep inexpensive surveys indicating
the angle of deviation at specified drilling depths.31 These regulations
presumably restricted widespread abuses arising from directional well
subsurface trespasses.
In the last few years, horizontal drilling and completion technology
has made great strides. Modem drilling techniques now permit opera-
tors to accurately place a wellbore within a few inches of a predetermined
subsurface location. Overzealous utilization of horizontal drilling tech-
nology, however, may trigger renewed allegations of directional well sub-
surface trespasses.
26. See generally 1 W. L. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 26, at 86 (1954 & John S.
Lowe, Supp. 1990).
27. Union Oil Co. v. Reconstruction Oil Co., 51 P.2d 81, 82 (Cal. 1935) (alleging that defend-
ant had used a whipstock to drill a "crooked-hole" that bottomed on plaintiff's oil and gas lease).
28. Id.
29. Eg., id. at 83 (holding that a court, under its inherent power to foster proper discovery,
could order a subsurface survey of a well alleged to have subsurface trespassed).
30. Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp. v. Nortex Oil & Gas Corp., 435 S.W.2d 854, 855 (Tex.
1968). The Woodbine Sand in the East Texas Field has been one the most prolific oil reservoirs in
North America. The drive mechanism of the Woodbine Sand is a water drive. Thus, downdip wells
at the periphery of the field watered out while updip wells continued to produce water-free oil. In
the early 1960's, it was discovered that many operators had illegally deviated wells onto neighboring
leases in order to get updip in the reservoir to postpone the watering out of their wells. Id.
31. SUMMERS, supra note 26, § 26, at 87 ("In some states the regulations of conservation agen-
cies require that directional surveys of wells be made and that records thereof be preserved. With
such available information a landowner or lessee may learn if his land has been subject to subsurface
trespass by adjoining owners.").
1993]
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b. Case Law in Ownership in Place Jurisdictions
A subsurface entry by means of a directional well certainly consti-
tutes a physical invasion of another person's property.32 Since the owner
of oil and gas rights in an ownership in place jurisdiction is generally
considered to hold a corporeal (possessory) interest in real property, 33
courts in ownership in place jurisdictions have experienced little diffi-
culty in applying the tort of trespass to a subsurface entry by a direc-
tional well.34
In 1950, the Texas Supreme Court in Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas Co.35
dealt with perhaps the earliest reported case of a directional well subsur-
face trespass in an ownership in place jurisdiction.36 In that case, the
Texas Company sought an injunction for an alleged subsurface trespass.
The Texas Company alleged that Hastings had reentered a well on the
Mays tract, leased by Hastings, and had sidetracked the hole in a south-
easterly direction, by means of a whipstock, such that the well encoun-
tered producing formations some 250 feet into the Phillips tract, leased
by the Texas Company. The case came to the Texas Supreme Court on
the relatively narrow issue of whether the trial court had the authority to
issue an order directing an independent expert to perform a directional
survey in the face of an allegation of subsurface trespass. Although the
court referred in dicta to its inherent power to issue such an order,37 the
32. See supra note 20 and accompanying text; see also McDaniel Bros. v. Wilson, 70 S.W.2d
618, 621 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (defining trespass on land as an act whereby a defendant makes entry
onto land without the authorization of the true owner). Note that specific intent to commit a subsur-
face trespass is not an element. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 6, § 227, at 396.1; W. PAGE
KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 13 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that
trespass typically requires an element of intent to be present, but the intent required may be satisfied
by a showing that the trespasser intended to be at the place where the trespass allegedly occurred,
regardless of whether the trespasser mistakenly and in good faith believed that he has committed no
wrong); PROSSER, supra note 20, § 13, at 63 ("The most important of the [ancient] trespass rules to
survive was that which imposed liability for invasions of property which were neither intended nor
negligent."). The intent of the operator does have a bearing, however, on the damage calculus. See
infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
33. For a discussion of the theory of ownership of oil and gas rights in an ownership in place
jurisdiction, see supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the corporeal nature
of oil and gas rights in an ownership in place jurisdiction, see supra notes 14-17 and accompanying
text.
34. See SUMMERS, supra note 26, § 26 ("Where, however, a well deviates from the vertical and
produces oil or gas from the lands of another, the courts have uniformly held such act constitutes a
trespass for which the injured party is entitled to damages, accounting and injunction.").
35. 234 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1950).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 396; see Union Oil Co. v. Reconstruction Oil Co., 51 P.2d 81 (Cal. 1935) (trial court
had inherent power to issue order for a directional survey of a well).
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court held that the Texas procedural rules impliedly authorized the or-
der.3" Implicit in the court's holding is the notion that a directional well
subsurface trespass, if proved, constitutes an actionable tort; otherwise, a
directional survey is irrelevant.39
As Hastings Oil demonstrates, a directional well subsurface trespass
in an ownership in place jurisdiction raises few issues as to whether the
elements of the tort are satisfied. A number of peripheral issues, how-
ever, are implicated. One of these issues, the availability of a court or-
dered directional survey, was addressed by the court in Hastings Oil.
Other issues raised by a directional well subsurface trespass include: (1)
identifying and applying the appropriate statute of limitations; (2) ascer-
taining the appropriate measure of damages; and (3) identifying potential
plaintiffs and potential defendants. The statute of limitations issue is
dealt with in a more expansive manner in the subsection on directional
well subsurface trespass in nonownership jurisdictions.'4  Where an ac-
tion is pursued for subsurface trespass, the statute of limitations for ordi-
nary trespasses generally applies.41
Ascertaining the measure of damages in a subsurface trespass case
largely turns on the issue of intent. Thus, as discussed above, while the
subsurface trespasser's intent is irrelevant to determining whether a tres-
pass occurred at all, it is certainly relevant to the measure of damages
exacted from the trespasser.42 Where a party is characterized as a "good
faith" trespasser, courts have uniformly held that the proper measure of
damages is the value in place of the oil and gas removed.43 The value of
the oil and gas in the reservoir is ordinarily determined by computing the
market value of the produced oil and gas and then deducting the reason-
able costs expended by the good faith trespasser to produce the oil and
38. Hastings Oil, 234 S.W.2d at 393 ("[W]e have concluded that the authority exercised by the
trial court is conferred by Rule 737, T.R.C.P., relating to discovery .. "); see also SUMMERS, supra
note 26, § 26, at 89 ("Orders for pretrial directional surveys of oil and gas wells in actions for
subsurface trespass have been upheld upon the basis of statutes or the inherent power of courts of
equity.").
39. The Hastings Oil court stated:
[I]t is said that in instances of trespass to mining property greater latitude is allowed courts
of equity than in restraining ordinary trespasses to realty, "since the injury goes to the
immediate destruction of the minerals which constitute the chief value of this species of
property." Trespasses of this character are irreparable because they subtract from the very
substance of the estate, hence equity is quick to restrain them.
Hastings Oil, 234 S.W.2d at 398 (citations omitted).
40. See infra notes 101-103 and accompanying text.
41. 1 EUGENE KuNTz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 11.10 (1987).
42. See generally, WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 6, § 227, at 390-96.4; KUNTz, supra note
41, §§ 11.3-.5.
43. E.g., Bender v. Brooks, 127 S.W. 168, 170 (Tex. 1910). Cf Payne v. Benavides, 693 S.W.2d
500, 504 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
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gas.' The test for good faith has been presented as follows: "To be in
good faith in developing a tract of land for oil or gas, one must have both
an honest and a reasonable belief in the superiority of one's title."45 In
the directional well subsurface trespass context, it must be shown that
the trespasser reasonably did not realize that the wellbore had wandered
into the adjoining property."
The "bad faith" trespasser, on the other hand, has typically been
subjected to liability to the extent of the value of the produced oil and
gas, without any deduction for the trespasser's costs of production.47
One possible exception exists: Where the plaintiff landowner has acted in
bad faith by knowingly permitting the trespasser to complete operations
44. In Bender, the Texas Supreme Court stated:
"It is the prevailing rule that in an action for unlawfully working a mine and extracting
coal or ore therefrom, if the taking was not a willful trespass, but was the result of an
honest mistake as to the true ownership of the mine, the measure of damages is the value of
the coal or ore as it was in the mine before it was disturbed. The recovery in such case is
limited first by the value of what is taken, and second by the cost of mining, extraction, and
hoisting to the surface or delivering at the pit's mouth." 20 Am. & Eng. Ency. p. 792 ...
Brooks being an innocent trespasser, the account between him and the landowner should
be taken by ascertaining the value of the oil when delivered at the surface or in tanks,
deducting the cost of lifting it from the well and placing it in the tanks; the difference
would be the sum to which the appellant would be entitled.
Bender, 127 S.W.2d at 170-171; see also Kumcz, supra note 41, § 11.3(a), at 308 ("The measure of
damages applied in such an instance [good faith trespass] is the value in place of the.., substance
which was removed. The method of arriving at such value ... is to determine the value of the
substance removed and then to deduct the reasonable costs expended in removing it.").
45. Payne, 693 S.W.2d 504, 504 (1985). In requiring the trespasser to have "an honest and a
reasonable belief" in the righteousness of his actions, this test for good faith has both subjective and
objective components. KurNTz, supra note 41, § 11.5, at 315 ("In general terms, it may be stated
that the defendant must have an honest belief in the superiority of his right or title, and such belief
must be a reasonable one in the light of the circumstances.").
46. Commentators have noted that the modem practice of routinely surveying drilling wells
makes a claim of good faith somewhat suspect. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 6, § 227, at 396.4
("With the making of directional well surveys a standard oil field practice, most trespasses would
seem to be intentional or at least inexcusably negligent."); KuNrrz, supra note 41, § 11.5, at 318
("When... a directional survey... reveals the trespass, the trespasser immediately becomes a bad
faith trespasser, but his bad faith does not have a retroactive effect on his right to recovery costs
expended in good faith.").
It is important to note in passing that, with the exception of Oklahoma, the trespasser seeking to
deduct production costs from the value of the produced oil and gas bears the burden of establishing
his good faith. KuNTrz, supra note 41, § 11.5, at 315; Sapulpa Petroleum Corp. v. McCray, 277 P.
589 (Okla. 1929).
47. Bender, 127 S.W. at 170 ("[Ain intentional trespasser.., would be responsible for its value
without compensation... for.., labor or money expended in producing it."); Payne, 693 S.W.2d at
506 ("[IThe measure of damages is 'the value of the things mined at the time of severance without
making deduction for the cost of labor and other expenses incurred in committing the wrongful act
... or for any value he may have added to the mineral by his labor.' ") (quoting Cage Bros. v.
Whiteman, 163 S.W.2d 638, 642 (Tex. 1942)).
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prior to asserting his rights, the trespasser may be liable only to the ex-
tent of the value in place of the oil and gas.48 In addition to the some-
what punitive nature of the bad faith trespass damage formula, a bad
faith subsurface trespass may also support an award of exemplary
damages.49
In addition to the pecuniary damages described above that may be
recovered from a good faith or bad faith directional well subsurface tres-
passer, an injunction is ordinarily available to preclude the continuing
trespass.50 Courts are more willing to grant an injunction in the case of a
subsurface trespass since the harm goes directly to the value of the min-
eral estate.51
Identification of potential plaintiffs in a directional well subsurface
trespass in an ownership in place jurisdiction is relatively straightfor-
ward. The mineral interest owner and the oil and gas lessee of the in-
vaded property represent the most obvious plaintiffs, since the mineral
interest owner and lessee own a corporeal interest in realty that has been
intentionally invaded.52 This requirement that the plaintiff hold a pres-
ent possessory interest theoretically prevents a lessor from pursuing an
action for subsurface trespass, since a lessor ordinarily has retained only
a royalty interest, an incorporeal interest.53 The same rationale pre-
cludes an overriding royalty interest owner from bringing an action for
48. KUNTZ, supra note 41, § 11.3(c), 310. This commentator stated:
The courts have demonstrated a similar lack of sympathy for an owner who is aware of the
trespass, but who stands by and awaits the outcome of the operation before asserting his
rights. In the instance of a bad faith owner, the defendant trespasser is liable for the value
of the substance removed, reduced by the reasonable costs expended in removing it, with-
out regard to the good or bad faith of the defendant.
Id. at 310.
49. Payne, 693 S.W.2d at 506 ("A conscious indifference to and disregard of the rights of
others, whether displayed while committing a surface trespass or a subsurface trespass, displayed by
one who trespasses in bad faith, is sufficient to support an award for exemplary damages."); Scurlock
Oil Co. v. Joffrion, 390 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965); see also KUNTZ, supra note 41, § 11.4, at
314.
50. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 6, § 227, at 396.2-.3 ("Even in the case of uninten-
tional directional drilling resulting in good faith subsurface trespass, production from the well may
be enjoined, at least where substantial injury results from the trespass."); SUMMERS, supra note 26,
§ 26, at 82 ("The directional drilling of a well through land subject to an oil and gas lease, consti-
tutes a trespass which may be enjoined by the lessee, although such well is bottomed in the tres-
passer's land."). But cf Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. L. & G. Oil Co., 259 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App.
1953) (denying an injunction to the mineral interest owner whose surface owner directionally drilled
a well to an adjacent lease where the surface owner owned the mineral interest).
51. Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 234 S.W.2d 389, 398 (Tex. 1950); see supra note 39).
52. PROSSER, supra note 20, § 13, at 77 ("The action for trespass is designed to protect the
interest in exclusive possession of the land in its intact physical condition. Therefore any person in
the actual and exclusive possession of the property may maintain the action, although he has no legal
title, and is himself in wrongful occupation .... ) (footnotes omitted).
53. Note, supra note 18, at 666 ("ITlhe . . . [directional well subsurface] trespass action is
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subsurface trespass.54
Identifying potential defendants in a directional well subsurface tres-
pass is more problematic. Obviously, the operator responsible for drill-
ing the trespassing well is liable for the consequences of his tortious
acts.5 5 The more interesting question is whether others may be held lia-
ble for a subsurface trespass.56 In Pacific Western Oil Co. v. Bern Oil
Co., the jury determined that the corporate defendant, Bern Oil, had
intentionally committed a directional well subsurface trespass into the
adjacent lease. The jury also found that three individual defendants, of-
ficers and shareholders of Bern Oil, by virtue of their "active charge and
management of its affairs," had entered into a conspiracy to drill the
illegal well. 8 The California Supreme Court upheld an award of bad
faith trespass damages against all defendants.59
Besides the trespassing entity and its managing employees, the list of
potential defendants could include independent contractors and agents.6
In Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp. v. Nortex Oil & Gas Corp. ,61 how-
ever, the Texas Supreme Court may have severely limited the potential
limited to parties in possession; therefore [the operator lessee] is the only party entitled to bring an
action for trespass since only [the lessor's] land has suffered a physical intrusion and [the lessee] has
the exclusive right to possession by virtue of the lease from [the lessor]."). The potential liability of a
lessee to lessor, where the lessee stands idly by in the face of a subsurface trespass, is beyond the
scope of this article.
54. Cf Grasty v. Wood, 230 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (overriding royalty interest
owner could not maintain action for trespass to try title, which is possessory in nature).
55. Kum-z, supra note 41, § 11.2, at 305.
56. Unfortunately, as one commentator notes, very little case law has probed the limits of po-
tential defendants in this context. Id.
57. 87 P.2d 1045 (Cal. 1939).
58. Id. at 1046. In affirming a judgment against defendant corporate officers for subsurface
trespass, the court conspicuously omitted any discussion of the "piercing of the corporate veil" doc-
trine. Thus, the officers' liability presumably arose out of their active participation in the trespass,
not simply by virtue of their corporate positions. This raises the question of whether other employ-
ees of the trespassing entity may be held personally liable for actively participating in the subsurface
trespass. For instance, would the liability extend to the entity's drilling engineer or drilling supervi-
sor? To lower level employees? To subcontractors? Narrowly interpreted, Pacific Western may be
understood to hold that only those corporate officers "in active charge and management" of the
subsurface trespass may be held personally liable. Id.
59. Id. at 1052.
60. McDaniel Bros. v. Wilson, 70 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (holding owner of lot
and independent contractor making excavations thereon jointly and severally liable where plaintiff's
building was damaged by virtue of trespass); Athens & Pomeroy Coal & Land Co. v. Tracy, 153
N.E. 240 (Ohio Ct. App. 1925), aff'd, 152 N.E. 641 (Ohio 1926) (holding that principal (coal mining
company) may be held liable for trespass of agent (superintendent of coal mine); however, rejecting
notion that punitive damages could be assessed against the company, absent a showing that the
president or other general officers of the company authorized, ratified, or participated in the wrong-
doing). But cf Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp. v. Nortex Oil & Gas Corp., 435 S.W.2d 854
(rex. 1968).
61. 435 S.W.2d 854 (rex. 1968).
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liability of an independent contractor working for a subsurface tres-
passer.62 Schlumberger arose out of the infamous East Texas Field slant
hole scandal.63 In 1961, Nortex purchased interests in certain oil and gas
leases in the East Texas Field. Nortex's predecessors in interest had fur-
nished data showing that oil production from the leases comported with
legal requirements. When the East Texas Field slant hole scandal broke
in 1962, Nortex discovered that a number of oil wells on its leases had
been directionally drilled so as to subsurface trespass across offsetting
lease lines. With the value of its leasehold interests thus diminished,
Nortex sued Schlumberger, asserting that Schlumberger had participated
in a conspiracy with Nortex's predecessor to commit a fraud upon
Nortex.
The court outlined, in detail, Schlumberger's role in the case.
Schlumberger is a well servicing company that specializes in logging and
perforating wells."1 Schlumberger had logged and perforated a signifi-
cant number of wells in the East Texas Field, including four of the illegal
directional wells located on the Nortex leases. While it is common
knowledge in the oil industry that the Woodbine Sand, the producing
formation in the East Texas Field, lies at a vertical depth of from 3,500
feet to 3,800 feet, the wells on the Nortex lease did not encounter Wood-
bine until logged depths of greater than 4,200 feet; thus, Schlumberger
had at least constructive knowledge that the wells had been directionally
drilled.65
When the East Texas Field slant hole scandal broke, the court noted
that Schlumberger had obstructed the official investigation in several
ways. First, Schlumberger developed a billing procedure whereby the
logging depth of the well was omitted from the customer's bill. 6 6 Second,
Schlumberger instructed its employees "to have poor memories" when
questioned about directional wells. 67 Finally, Schlumberger destroyed an
62. Id.
63. Id. at 855-56; see supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
64. The court described Schlumberger's services as follows:
"Logging" is a service performed by lowering an electronic device into a well to locate the
point in the bore hole at which the producing sands life [sic]. "Perforating" is a service
performed by lowering a mechanical device into a well to perforate holes in the well casing
at the point where the logging shows the producing sands to lie, so that oil can seep from
the sands into the well and be recovered by natural or artificial lift.
Shlumberger, 435 S.W.2d at 856.
65. The length of a directional well, the "logged depth", will always exceed the well's vertical
depth, just as the length of the hypotenuse of a right triangle always exceeds the length of either of
the other two sides.




Ragsdale: Hydraulic Fracturing: The Stealthy Subsurface Trespass
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1992
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
extensive library of logs showing the depths of many East Texas wells. 68
Nortex alleged that these facts, cumulatively, supported a reasonable in-
ference that Schlumberger had joined in a conspiracy with Nortex's pred-
ecessors to drill wells which subsurface trespassed on adjacent leases.69
At the trial level, the district court judge withdrew the case from the
jury after Nortex had presented its evidence.7° The case came before the
Texas Supreme Court on the issue of whether any evidence existed that
Schlumberger had participated in a conspiracy to defraud Nortex.71 The
court concluded that, while Nortex was certainly the victim of a fraud,
Nortex failed to link Schlumberger to the conspiracy in two critical re-
spects: (1) "knowledge of the object of the conspiracy," and (2) "[spe-
cific] intention to injure adjoining owners."72 The court explained its
rationale as follows:
For purposes of this opinion, we may assume that Schlumberger
had good reason to believe that the conspiracy existed as alleged by
Nortex, and that the existence and object of the conspiracy could have
been discovered by Schlumberger by the exercise of the slightest degree
of diligence. We are unwilling to say, however, that the evidence will
support a reasonable inference that Schlumberger had actual knowl-
edge that the four particular wells had been or were to be bottomed
under adjoining or adjacent leases for the purpose of producing oil
owned by others, or that Schlumberger intended to participate in any
such wrong. In the absence of such knowledge and intent, a finding
that Schlumberger was a conspirator with the lease owners, drillers
and others to bottom the wells beyond the lease lines and wrongfully
take the oil of others is insupportable.
There is no evidence that Schlumberger knew the location of the
boundary lines of the leases on which the four wells had their surface
locations. There is no evidence that Schlumberger knew or was ad-
vised that the wells had to be bottomed beyond lease lines in order to
produce ... There is no evidence that Schlumberger falsified any logs
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 855.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 856. The court defined conspiracy as follows:
A civil conspiracy has been defined by this court as 'a combination by two or more
persons to accomplish an unlawful purpose ... by unlawful means.' ... It follows that a
conspiracy to do nothing more than violate Rule 54 by deviating the four Nortex wells,
without a Railroad Commission permit, would have been meaningless as a civil conspiracy
without the added plan or scheme to violate another provision of the Rule and bottom the
wells under leases of others with the intention of taking the oil of such others.
One without knowledge of the object and purpose of a conspiracy cannot be a co-
conspirator; he cannot agree, either expressly or tacitly, to the commission of a wrong
which he knows not of.
Id. at 856-57 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 28:311
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or performed any act to hoodwink the Railroad Commission into
granting an allowable to the wells. There is no evidence that Schlum-
berger shared in any of its customer's il-gotten gains. The uncontra-
dicted evidence is that Schlumberger was performing a service for
which it was paid on a professional basis at its regular and customary
rate.
7 3
By narrowly construing the specific intent element, the Texas
Supreme Court fashioned a rule in Schlumberger which broadly shields a
service company from liability based on conspiracy to defraud. It is im-
portant to note, however, that the court had no reason to address
whether Schlumberger had committed a subsurface trespass by virtue of
logging and perforating a directional well bottomed across the lease
line.74 If the offsetting mineral interest owner had sued Schlumberger for
subsurface trespass, Schlumberger's ignorance as to the location of the
lease line presumably would be no defense since specific intent is not an
element of that tort. The interesting question under these circumstances
is whether the full extent of good faith trespasser damages would be re-
coverable from Schiumberger, solely as a result of its logging and per-
forating services.7
c. Case Law in Nonownership Jurisdictions
Recall that a mineral interest owner in a nonownership jurisdiction
is considered to have an interest in the nature of a profit a prendre, an
exclusive, incorporeal right to use the premises to search for and develop
oil and gas.76 Strictly adhering to the classical definition of trespass, it
would seem theoretically impossible for one to commit a subsurface tres-
pass against a mineral interest owner in a nonownership jurisdiction,
since the owner holds only a nonpossessory interest. Courts in nonown-
ership jurisdictions, however, have generally been willing to sidestep this
doctrinal dilemma and have applied the same subsurface trespass princi-
ples in the directional well context as have courts in ownership in place
jurisdictions.
Indeed the earliest directional well subsurface trespass cases arose in
a nonownership state. In 1935, the California Supreme Court in Union
73. Id. at 857-58.
74. Cf Gifford Operating Co. v. Indrex, Inc., No. 2:89-CV-0189 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 1992); Geo
Viking, Inc. v. Tex-Lee Operating Co., 817 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991). In Gifford Operating
and Geo Viking, liability is imposed on service companies involved in hydraulic fracture subsurface
trespasses. For detailed discussion of these cases, see infra notes 137-156 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 157-158 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
1993)
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Oil Co. v. Reconstruction Oil Co. 77 held that a trial court had the inherent
power to order a directional survey of defendant's oil well where plaintiff
had applied for an injunction to enjoin defendant "from trespassing by
means of whipstocking or 'crooked-hole drilling' upon property leased by
plaintiff."78 With no more than this passing reference, the court implic-
itly acknowledged directional well subsurface trespass as a viable cause
of action in California, a nonownership jurisdiction.
In 1939, the California Supreme Court again considered a direc-
tional well subsurface trespass case. In Pacific Western Oil Co. v. Bern
Oil Co.,79 Pacific drilled and completed seven producing wells on a par-
ticular oil and gas lease.8" After determining that a fault separated the
productive portion (parcel A) from the nonproductive portion (parcel B)
of its lease, Pacific quitclaimed parcel B to its lessor.8" Defendants subse-
quently leased parcel B and drilled three directional wells that intention-
ally were bottomed on parcel A, Pacific's lease.82 Pacific sued to enjoin
defendants' operations and to recover bad faith directional well subsur-
face trespass damages.83 In upholding Pacific's right to recover bad faith
trespass damages, the court failed, as it also failed four years earlier in
Union Oil, to discuss the incongruency in affording the possessory tort of
trespass to Pacific, which merely held an incorporeal interest.8 4
Following Union Oil and Pacific Western, lower courts in California
have recognized directional well subsurface trespass as a tort without
questioning its application to incorporeal oil and gas rights in a nonown-
ership jurisdiction. In Hancock Oil Co. v. Meeker-Garner Oil Co.,85 Han-
cock and Meeker were lessees in oil and gas leases on adjoining tracts.8 6
Meeker secured an easement from Hancock's lessor, who owned the sur-
face, for the purpose of directionally drilling a well from the surface of
Hancock's lease to be bottomed on Meeker's lease.87 Although Hancock
77. 51 P.2d 81 (Cal. 1935).
78. Id. at 81, 83. The court's precise holding was that the trial court's order was interlocutory
in nature and, hence, not appealable prior to final judgment. Id. at 83. The court further noted that
the trial court's order fully protected the defendant from any possible injury by requiring plaintiff to
post a bond. Id. at 82.
79. 87 P.2d 1045 (Cal. 1939). For a discussion of Pacific Western in the context of the liability
of corporate officers for subsurface trespass, see supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
80. Pacific Western, 87 P.2d at 1046.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1047.
84. Id. at 1050.
85. 257 P.2d 988 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953).
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stipulated that Meeker's well did not physically obstruct any of Han-
cock's operations,88 Hancock sued to enjoin the subsurface trespass.
Meeker contended that:
[T]he Meeker-Garner well, as drilled-slanted from the surface of
[Hancock's lease] into [Meeker's lease] where it was to be bottomed-
does not constitute a trespass against either Hancock or the owner-
lessors ... for the reason that the exclusive right to produce oil and gas
under the [Hancock] lease is limited to production by Hancock from
wells bottomed under the surface of the lots covered by that lease. 89
In affirming the grant of injunction, the court rejected Meeker's argu-
ment, concluding that Meeker had committed a directional well subsur-
face trespass. 90 The court explained simply that "one who drills through
leased land to cause drainage from it violates the lessee's rights and com-
mits a trespass against him. Such conduct being a trespass against the
lessee, it can make no difference that the owner-lessor has consented." 91
The court's perfunctory statement of its rationale sidestepped any discus-
sion of the incorporeal interest of an oil and gas lessee in a nonownership
jurisdiction.
Other leading nonownership jurisdictions have followed California's
lead in recognizing the directional well subsurface trespass as a viable
cause of action.92 In Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil Co., the Louisiana Supreme
Court stated that when a well is deviated from the vertical such that it is
bottomed in the neighboring property, "there is a 'subsurface trespass',
whether the deviation is normal or whether it is brought about by inten-
tional controlled directional drilling."94 Unlike the California courts, the
88. Id. at 991.
89. Id. at 990.
90. Id. at 991.
The trespass here was a subsurface trespass in an oil and gas producing area. It was con-
ceded by plaintiffs on the trial that they could make no such showing as to actual damage
as would justify an award of damages in any specific amount.... Such concession, how-
ever, does not justify the conclusion that plaintiffs had suffered no injury. It has heretofore
been held in a case involving a subsurface trespass by way of tunneling that "the injury is
irreparable in itself."
Id. (citations omitted).
91. Id. at 992.
92. In Louisiana, see Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So. 2d 955 (La.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 925 (1986); Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil Co., 16 So. 2d 471 (La. 1943); Reitzell v. Spooner, 505 So. 2d
829 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 507 So. 2d 227 (La. 1987); Note, Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co.:
Property Rights--Effects of Louisiana's Oil and Gas Conservation Statute, 61 TUL. L. REv. 700
(1987). In Oklahoma, see Edwards v. Lachman, 567 P.2d 73 (Okla. 1977); Edwards v. Lachman,
534 P.2d 670 (Okla. 1974); Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Co., 457 F.2d 850 (10th Cir.
1972).





Ragsdale: Hydraulic Fracturing: The Stealthy Subsurface Trespass
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1992
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28:311
Louisiana court did not ignore the doctrinal problem of whether one
could trespass against the owner of incorporeal oil and gas rights in a
nonownership jurisdiction. The court first reaffrmed the notion that a
mineral interest owner in Louisiana does not own the oil and gas in place
but merely holds "an exclusive right to explore his land for the produc-
tion of manerals [sic] and to extract therefrom, and reduce to possession
and ownership, all such minerals as may be found in the earth beneath
the surface of his land." '95 The court concluded, however, that this own-
ership right "necessarily excludes the right of any person to invade the
subsurface of his neighbor's land and to extract therefrom fugacious min-
erals, such as oil and gas. Such invasion would be a trespass."96 Thus,
Louisiana, like California, is willing to overlook the nonpossessory na-
ture of an oil and gas lessee's rights and to permit a cause of action for
directional well subsurface trespass.97
Like California and Louisiana, Oklahoma also has accepted the di-
rectional well trespass as an actionable tort. In three opinions arising
from essentially identical facts, courts have definitively dealt with the di-
rectional well subsurface trespass under Oklahoma law.98 In Edwards v.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Cf Reitzell v. Spooner, 505 So. 2d 829 (La. Ct. App.) (holding an operator liable for tres-
pass even though he did not participate in the surveying, staking or drilling of a well in the wrong
location on the grounds that the operator directed the well to be drilled at the staked location), writ
denied, 507 So. 2d 227 (La. 1987). But cf Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So. 2d 955 (La.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 925 (1986). In Nunez, the Louisiana Commissioner of Conservation issued an
order establishing a compulsory 350-acre drilling unit encompassing several tracts, including Nu-
nez's unleased tract and the Stone tract, leased by Wainoco. When Wainoco received a permit to
drill a unit well on the Stone tract, Nunez opted to pay his proportionate share of drilling costs in
return for a proportionate share of production rather than retaining a nonparticipating royalty inter-
est. After the well was completed, a directional survey revealed that the well bore had migrated
from the Stone tract and had been bottomed in the Nunez tract. Under a subsurface trespass theory,
Nunez sued for an injunction ordering Wainoco to remove the well bore. In granting summary
judgment to Wainoco, the Louisiana Supreme Court first set forth its definition of subsurface tres-
pass from Gliptis. The court distinguished Gliptis, however, as not involving a compulsory unitiza-
tion order from the Commissioner under which private ownership concepts are subjugated to the
state's interests in conserving natural resources and protecting the correlative rights of nondrilling
landowners. Id. at 963. The court summarized its holding as follows:
Therefore, we conclude that the intrusion into the subsurface two miles beneath the tract
owned by Adam Nunez was an authorized unit operation. Since established private prop-
erty law concepts, such as trespass, have been superceded in part by Louisiana's Conserva-
tion Law when a unit has been created by order of the Commissioner, we do not find that a
legally actionable trespass has occurred in this instance.
Id. at 964.
98. Edwards v. Lachman (Lachman III), 567 P.2d 73 (Okla. 1977); Edwards v. Lachman
(Lachman II), 534 P.2d 670 (Okla. 1974); Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Co. (Lachman I),
457 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1972). For a detailed discussion of the Lachman cases, see infra notes 99-
100 and 108-114 and accompanying text and note 117.
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Lachman (Lachman II), 99 Lachman, lessee of the Fuqua tract, drilled a
directional well that bottomed in the adjacent Graham tract in two pro-
ducing formations, the Dornick Hills and the Springer Sands. Royalty
interest owners in the Graham tract and working interest owners in a
well drilled on the Graham tract (collectively "Edwards") sued under a
subsurface trespass theory for an injunction ordering Lachman to plug
back its well to the property line and for an accounting. Evidence at trial
revealed that Lachman completed its well in September 1966 but only
became aware of the subsurface trespass following a directional survey in
April 1967. Lachman did not, however, divulge the survey results to
Edwards. The trial court determined, inter alia, that Lachman was liable
for subsurface trespass. The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the find-
ing of liability but reversed and remanded as to the issue of damages. In
the first five pages of its opinion, the court analyzed in detail the issue of
whether Lachman should be characterized as a good faith trespasser or a
bad faith trespasser; in so doing, the court implicitly accepted the viabil-
ity of Edwards' cause of action for subsurface trespass even though Ed-
wards held only incorporeal interests."
In sum, a number of nonownership jurisdictions have held that an
action for directional well subsurface trespass may be maintained in a
nonownership jurisdiction by a plaintiff holding only an incorporeal in-
terest. As in the previous subsection on directional well subsurface tres-
pass in ownership in place jurisdictions, a number of peripheral issues
merit discussion, including: (1) identifying and applying the appropriate
statute of limitations; (2) ascertaining the appropriate measure of dam-
ages; and (3) identifying potential plaintiffs and potential defendants. As
to the statute of limitations for a directional well subsurface trespass, one
nonownership state was so concerned about the potential for litigation
that it enacted an extremely short statute of limitations specifically for a
99. 534 P.2d 670 (Okla. 1974).
100. Id. at 672-76. Recall that the Lachman II plaintiffs were the working interest owners in the
well on the Graham tract and the royalty interest owners in the Graham tract. Ordinarily, these
types of interests are incorporeal in a nonownership jurisdiction. See supra notes 14 to 17 and ac-
companying text. In accepting the directional well subsurface trespass theory, the court ignored the
possessory nature of a traditional trespass action.
Lachman did assert one novel argument, arguing that the rule of capture should be displaced by
the ownership in place rule to calculate damages for an innocent trespass. Lackman II, 534 P.2d at
676. Lachman contended that expert petroleum engineers could establish that only 47 percent of the
total production from Lachman's well bottomed on the adjacent Graham tract actually was drained
from the Graham tract, the remaining 53 percent being drained from the Fuqua tract. Thus, Lach-
man argued that any good faith trespass damages must be reduced by 53 percent. The court rejected
Lachman's assertion and retained the rule of capture. Id.
1993]
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directional well subsurface trespass."' 1 In California, a 180-day statute
of limitations is applied to actions based on an unintentional directional
well subsurface trespass. For a bad faith trespass, however, the cause of
action does not accrue until discovery by the aggrieved party.102 Other
states apply their general statutes of limitations for trespass or conversion
to a subsurface trespass. 103
The damage calculus for a directional well subsurface trespass in a
nonownership jurisdiction essentially mirrors that previously discussed
for an ownership in place jurisdiction."w The subsurface trespassers' in-
tent is again the controlling factor. The good faith trespasser is typically
liable only for the value of the oil and gas in place, usually determined by
deducting reasonable costs of production from the market value of the oil
101. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 349 3/4 (West 1991) (originally adopted in 1935). This statute
provides:
Within one hundred eighty days:
(a) An action to enjoin, abate, or for damages on account of, an underground tres-
pass, use or occupancy, by means of a well drilled for oil or gas or both from a surface
location on land other than real property in which the aggrieved party has some right, title
or interest or in respect to which the aggrieved party has some right, title or interest.
(b) An action for conversion or for the taking or removing of oil, gas or other liquid,
or fluids by means of any such well.
When any of said acts is by means of a new well the actual drilling of which is com-
menced after this section becomes effective, and such act was knowingly committed with
actual intent to commit such act, the cause of action in such case shall not be deemed to
have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the act or acts complained of;
but in all other cases, and as to wells heretofore or hereafter drilled, the cause of action
shall be deemed to have accrued ten days after the time when the well which is the subject
of the cause of action was first placed on production.
Notwithstanding the continuing character of any such act, there shall be but one cause
of action for any such act, and the cause of action shall accrue as aforesaid.
In all cases where oil or gas has been heretofore or is hereafter extracted from any
existing or subsequently drilled well in this State, by a person without right but asserting a
claim of right in good faith or acting under an honest mistake of law or fact, the measure of
damages, if there be any right of recovery under existing law, shall be the value of the oil or
gas at the time of extraction, without interest, after deducting all costs of development,
operation and production, which costs shall include taxes and interest on all expenditures
from the date thereof.
This section shall apply to causes of action existing when this section becomes effec-
tive. The time for commencement of existing causes of action which would be barred by
this section within the first one hundred eighty days after this section becomes effective,
shall be the said first one hundred eighty days.
Whenever the term "oil" is used in this section it shall be taken to include "petro-
leum," and the term "gas" shall mean natural gas coming from the earth.
The limitations prescribed by this section shall not apply to rights of action or actions
to be brought in the name of or for the benefit of the people of this State, or of any county,
city and county, city or other political subdivision of this State.
Id.
102. Id.
103. See generally SUMMERS, supra note 26, § 26, at 83 & n.82; KuNrz, supra note 41, § 11.10,
at 328. A more detailed discussion of the statute of limitations is reserved for the section on
conversion.
104. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
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and gas removed." 5 In Oklahoma, however, the good faith trespasser
may not deduct drilling and completion costs which confer no benefits
upon the aggrieved owner of oil and gas rights.' 6 Also unique to
Oklahoma, the aggrieved party bears the burden of establishing that the
trespasser did not act in good faith.' 7 The Lachman cases arising in
Oklahoma exemplify these damage principles.
In Lachman 11,108 Lachman ostensibly did not discover that it had
committed a directional well subsurface trespass until a directional sur-
vey was run nearly a year after the well was completed.' 09 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that Lachman became a bad faith tres-
passer following the survey since Lachman failed to inform Edwards of
the subsurface trespass. The court further held that, since Edwards had
not shown that Lachman had bad faith when it drilled and completed the
offending well, Lachman's subsequent knowledge of the subsurface tres-
pass "did not convert them into 'bad faith' trespassers ipso facto."' "10 As
to good faith trespass damages, the court opined that Lachman could not
(in addition to production costs) deduct drilling and completion costs
which conferred no benefit upon Edwards."' The court remanded the
105. Lachman II, 534 P.2d at 674; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 349 3/4 (For a subsurface trespass
"by a person without right but asserting a claim of right in good faith or acting under an honest
mistake of law or fact, the measure of damages... shall be the value of the oil or gas at the time of
extraction, without interest, after deducting all costs of development, operation and production.").
106. Lachman II, 534 P.2d at 675 ("[A]n innocent trespasser, who produces the hydrocarbons of
a rightful owner of the oil and gas rights, is not entitled to his drilling and completion costs if by
such drilling and completion, no benefits are conferred upon the rightful owner."). A good faith
trespasser will always be able to deduct the reasonable costs of production, in contrast to costs of
drilling and completion that may or may not confer a benefit upon the rightful owner.
107. See KuiNrz, supra note 41, § 11.5, at 315; Sapulpa Petroleum Corp. v. McCray, 277 P. 589
(Okla. 1929).
108. 534 P.2d 670 (Okla. 1974).
109. For the background of Lachman I, see supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
110. Lachman I, 534 P.2d at 673-74.
111. Id. at 675. In determining the extent of the benefits conferred upon Edwards, the court
stated that the following factors should be considered by the trial court on remand:
Did the drilling of the [Lachman) well tend to prove plaintiffs' land or impart any informa-
tion to the plaintiffs that would constitute benefits to plaintiffs?; did defendants' production
from the Springer Sand, the sand plaintiffs' well did not penetrate and from which it did
not produce, confer benefits upon plaintiffs or their property?; and what would the costs
have been for plaintiffs to have drilled and completed their well to the Springer Sand?
Id. at 678.
The court excluded some items from consideration on remand. For instance, the court noted
that Edwards had not challenged the propriety of permitting a deduction for Lachman's lifting costs
and gross production taxes. Id. at 677. The court also noted that Lachman was not entitled to a
credit for royalty payments to its royalty owners, since those royalty owners "were not entitled to
their proportionate share of the production wrongfully produced from plaintiffs' land." Id. Cf
Pauley v. Faucett, 269 P.2d 89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954) (holding that royalty interest owner of land
where directional well is surfaced is not entitled to royalty payments where well is bottomed on
adjacent tract).
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case for a redetermination of Lachman's good faith trespass damages.' 12
The primary issue on remand was the determination of the benefit
conferred upon Edwards by the Lachman well. Recall that the Lachman
well was drilled through two producing formations, the Dornick Hills
and the Springer, under Edwards' land. Without knowledge of Lach-
man's subsurface trespass, Edwards drilled a producer only to the shal-
lower Dornick Hills Sand. The trial court determined that. the Edwards
well was capable of draining the Dornick Hills without assistance from
the Lachman well. The trial court also found that Edwards benefitted
from the drilling of the Lachman well from the Dornick Hills to the
Springer, but not from the Springer to the total depth of the well. Based
on these findings, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Lachman 111, 1" held
that Lachman was entitled to deduct only the reasonable cost of drilling
from the Dornick Hills at 8,077 feet to the bottom of the Springer at
9,430 feet.1 14
Finally, the identification of potential plaintiffs and potential defend-
ants for a directional well subsurface action in a nonownership jurisdic-
tion basically tracks the analysis for ownership in place jurisdictions. 1
As demonstrated above, leading nonownership jurisdictions, such as Cal-
ifornia, Louisiana, and Oklahoma, afford a cause of action for directional
well subsurface trespass to a plaintiff owner of oil and gas rights despite
the notion that the oil and gas interest owner holds only a incorporeal
estate. In Oklahoma, courts have even permitted royalty interest owners
to maintain an action for subsurface trespass. 116 Thus, the incorporeal
nature of oil and gas rights in nonownership jurisdictions has not proven
to be a limitation on an action for subsurface trespass. Liability for po-
tential defendants, such as the operator of the trespassing well, its officers
and employees, its agents, and its independent contractors does not sub-
stantially differ from that discussed for ownership in place
112. To summarize, as of Lachman II, the following relief had been granted to Edwards as a
result of Lachman's directional well subsurface trespass:
1. An injunction ordering Lachman to plug its well back to the property line.
2. An accounting for all hydrocarbons produced from Lachman's well.
3. Good faith trespasser damages up to the time of the directional survey. Lachman
could deduct lifting costs and gross production taxes. Lachman could deduct drilling
and completion costs to the extent that a benefit was conferred upon Edwards. Lach-
man could not deduct royalty payments to its royalty owners.
4. Bad faith trespasser damages subsequent to the time of the directional survey.
Lachman II, 534 P.2d at 672, 675, 677-78.
113. 567 P.2d 73 (Okla. 1977).
114. Id. at 75-76.
115. See supra notes 52-75 and accompanying text.
116. Lachman II, 534 P.2d at 672.
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2. Injected Fluids Subsurface Trespass
While courts have had little difficulty in applying trespass theory to
a directional well subsurface trespass, the issue of a subsurface entry
from injected fluids has proven more problematic. Typical scenarios in-
clude: (1) pumping salt water (or other fluid) into an injection well as
part of an enhanced recovery operation to "sweep" hydrocarbons toward
producing wells, thereby recovering reserves incremental to primary re-
covery; (2) pumping salt water into a well to inexpensively dispose of
"waste" fluids in a salt water formation; and (3) injecting natural gas into
an underground storage reservoir.1 18 In each of these scenarios, it is pos-
sible for the injected fluids to disperse from the injection well and to
make a subsurface entry into an adjoining property, sweeping hydrocar-
bons from beneath the adjoining property. Aggrieved owners have sued
under theories such as subsurface trespass and private nuisance to re-
cover remedies for injected fluid subsurface entries. Due to strong public
policies of promoting these types of operations, courts have been cautious
in finding liability for injected fluid subsurface entries and in fashioning
remedies.
Due to the maturity of oil fields in the United States, enhanced re-
covery operations have become increasingly important in maximizing in-
cremental recovery over and above recovery from primary operations.
Conservation laws in producing states evidence the strong public policy
to promote enhanced recovery operations.119 Enhanced recovery fluids
pumped into an injection well may inadvertently or unavoidably enter an
adjoining property and sweep hydrocarbons from beneath the adjoining
property. In the absence of a compulsory unitization order, courts have
117. See supra notes 55-75 and accompanying text. One interesting question is whether a direc-
tional surveying service company under contract with the operator is liable for breach of contract if
the surveyor discloses the subsurface trespass. In Lachman I, Lachman contracted with Sperry-Sun
to directionally survey a well that had been turnkey-drilled for Lachman by an independent contrac-
tor. Lachman I, 457 F.2d at 851. Sperry-Sun revealed the survey results to Edwards, the owners of
oil and gas rights on the adjoining tract. Edwards subsequently won a judgment for subsurface
trespass against Lachman. (See supra notes 99-100, 108-114 and accompanying text). Lachman
then sued Sperry-Sun for breach of contract. The Tenth Circuit held that, while the non-disclosure
provision of the contract was not void on its face, Sperry-Sun's disclosure did not amount to a breach
in light of Oklahoma's strong public policy interest in encouraging the disclosure of illegal activity.
Lachman I, 457 F.2d at 853-854.
118. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 6, § 204.5, at 60; SUMMERS, supra note 26, § 28.5, at 12.
119. Railroad Comm'n v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 568 (rex. 1962); SUMMERS, supra note 26,
§ 28.5, at 12.
19931
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generally held that an operator may be held liable for a subsurface en-
croachment by injected fluids in an enhanced recovery operation, at least
to the extent that the encroachment reduces the primary recovery from
the adjoining property.1 20  Even in the compulsory unitization context,
courts have subjected unit operators to limited liability.1 21 Thus, the
strong public policy to encourage enhanced recovery operations has sub-
stantially, but not entirely, shielded unit operators from liability for an
120. Eg., Jameson v. Ethyl Corp., 609 S.W.2d 346 (Ark. 1980). The Arkansas Supreme Court
stated the dilemma and a solution as follows:
A determination that a trespass or nuisance occurs through secondary recovery
processes within a recovery area would tend to promote waste of such natural resources
and extend unwarranted bargaining power to minority landowners. On the other hand, a
determination that the rule of capture should be expanded to cover the present situation
could unnecessarily extend the license of mineral extraction companies to appropriate min-
erals which might be induced to be moved from other properties through such processes
and, in any event, further extend the bargaining power of such entities to reduce royalty
payments to landowners who are financially unable to "go and do likewise"....
[W]e... are holding that reasonable and necessary secondary recovery processes of
pools of transient materials should be permitted, when such operations are carried out in
good faith for the purpose of maximizing recovery from a common pool. The permitting of
this good faith recovery process is conditioned, however, by imposing an obligation on the
extracting party to compensate the owner of the depleted lands for the minerals extracted
in excess of natural depletion, if any, at the time of the taking and for any special damages
which may have been caused to the depleted property.
Id. at 351. But see Manziel, 361 S.W.2d at 568-69:
We conclude that if, in the valid exercise of its authority .... the Commission authorizes
secondary recovery projects, a trespass does not occur when the injected, secondary recov-
ery forces move across lease lines, and the operations are not subject to an injunction on
that basis. The technical rules of trespass have no place in the consideration of the validity
of the orders of the Commission.
Id.
121. E.g., Baumgartner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 168 N.W.2d 510 (Neb. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
913 (1970). The Nebraska Supreme Court stated:
Did [defendants] incur liability for willful trespass? We hold they did not....
We have reached the conclusion that where the primary recoverable oil has been ex-
hausted, all interested parties in the field must be offered an opportunity to join in any
unitization project to recover secondary oil on a fair and equitable basis, and if any inter-
ested party refuses to join he should not be permitted to capitalize on that refusal. To hold
otherwise would discourage unitization and encourage rather than avoid waste. Conse-
quently, we hold where a secondary recovery project has been authorized by the commis-
sion the operator is not liable for willful trespass to owners who refused to join the project
when the injected recovery substance moves across lease lines.
Under the facts herein the most that plaintiff should have a right to recover is what he
can prove through his own efforts if he had drilled, developed, and operated his property
outside the unitization project ....
Id. at 516, 519. See also Tidewater Oil Co. v. Jackson, 320 F.2d 157, 163 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 942 (1963):
[I]t is safe to assume that, though a water flood project in Kansas be carried on under color
of public law, as a legalized nuisance or trespass, the water flooder may not conduct opera-
tions in a manner to cause substantial injury to the property of a non-assenting lessee-
producer in the common reservoir, without incurring the risk of liability therefor.
Id.; see generally WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 6, § 204.5, at 60 (acknowledging that their
proposed "negative rule of capture" never developed in the case law, with the exception of Manziel).
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injected fluids subsurface trespass.122
Where an injected fluids subsurface entry has resulted from the
pumping of salt water into a well to inexpensively dispose of "waste"
fluids in a salt water formation, courts have been reluctant to award relief
for two reasons: (1) the inability of the aggrieved landowner to prove
actual harm; and (2) the public policy to prevent economic waste by in-
suring that wells with a high water cut are not shut in for lack of an
inexpensive method of salt water disposal. Here, as in the authorized
secondary recovery context, the party that obtains the appropriate per-
mit from the conservation authority is fairly well insulated from liabil-
ity. 123 However, the courts have not entirely foreclosed an action for
damages. If the aggrieved landowner can prove harm from offsetting salt
water disposal operations, the landowner may pursue an action for in-
jected fluids subsurface trespass. 124
Finally, where natural gas has been injected into an underground
storage reservoir that extends across lease lines, a court has held that title
to the injected gas is not lost even though it migrates into offsetting sub-
surface property. 25 One commentator has stated that "[t]hough there is
122. The cases analyzing an injected fluids subsurface entry are basically are in accord with the
foregoing discussion in the text. See supra notes 122-124 and accompanying text.
The theory of ownership of a jurisdiction has little influenced the availability of a cause of action
for injected fluids subsurface trespass. See WILLIAMs & MEYERS, supra note 6, § 204.5, at 60.1-.2.
123. E.g., Raymond v. Union Tex. Petroleum Corp., 697 F. Supp. 270 (E.D. La. 1988). Opera-
tors of a unitized reservoir received a permit from the Commissioner to dispose of salt water from
the entire field (i.e., including non-unit salt water production) in a well located within the unit.
Raymond and others owning land within the unit sued the operators under a theory of injected fluids
subsurface trespass. The district court held that no legally actionable trespass existed for two rea-
sons. First, while acknowledging that Raymond's petroleum expert had established by a preponder-
ance that the injected salt water had migrated to their subsurface property, the court concluded as a
matter of law that Raymond could not prove whether any of the non-unit salt water commingled
with the unit salt water had invaded their property. Second, even assuming that Raymond could
establish invasion by non-unit salt water, the court held that Nunez abrogated traditional property
law, such as trespass, when a conflict with conservation orders arises. Id. at 273-74; see supra note
97. The court's unconvincing first rationale exemplifies the extent to which courts will go to avoid
finding an injected fluids subsurface trespass in the context of salt water disposal wells. See also West
Edmond Salt Water Disposal Ass'n v. Rosecrans, 226 P.2d 965, 969 (Okla. 1950); see generally
SUMMERS, supra note 26, § 28.5 at 12.
124. Eg., Snyder Ranches, Inc. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 798 P.2d 587 (N.M. 1990). The
New Mexico Supreme Court determined substantial evidence supported the Commission's finding
that a sealing fault would prevent migration of salt water from Mobil's disposal well into the salt
water zone beneath Snyder Ranches' property. The court noted that Mobil's license to dispose of
salt water in the well did not, however, authorize trespass by Mobil nor immunize Mobil from
liability for negligence or nuisance. The court concluded, in dicta, that "[i]n the event that an actual
trespass occurs by Mobil in its injection operation, neither the Commission's decision ... nor this
opinion would in any way prevent Snyder Ranches from seeking redress for such trespass." Id. at
590.
125. Lone Star Gas Co. v. Murchison, 353 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Ct. App. 1962); SUMMERS, supra
note 26, § 28.5.
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inevitably a trespass here, it is to be doubted that an injunction should
issue for the trespass is irretrievable when it has occurred, public policy
should favor good faith storage efforts, and continuing trespass technical-
ities aside, the remedy at law in damages actually is sufficient." '26
3. Hydraulic Fracture Subsurface Trespass
Drawing upon the principles derived from the directional well sub-
surface trespass cases and from the injected fluids subsurface trespass
cases, the following is an analysis of the viability of a cause of action for
subsurface trespass in the context of hydraulic fracture. In a hydraulic
fracturing operation, a viscous fluid is mixed with a proppant and
pumped with sufficient pressure into a well bore to create a crack ("frac-
ture") in the reservoir rock that extends laterally from the well into the
producing formation. The proppant is designed to keep the fracture
open and to maintain a "highly-conductive drainage path through the
tight reservoir rock matrix for oil and gas flowing to the borehole." '27
Since the lateral direction of the fracture is controlled, not by the opera-
tor, but by least compressive stress of the formation rock, a long fracture
poses a potential subsurface trespass. 128
126. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. West, 508 S.W.2d 812, 816 (rex. 1974); SUMMERS, supra note 26,
§ 28.5.
127. DETLEF MADER, HYDRAULIC PROPPANT FRACTURING AND GRAVEL PACKING xxi
(1989). The first hydraulic fracture operation was performed in 1947 in the Hugoton natural gas
field in western Kansas. Since that time, operators typically have used hydraulic fractures to accom-
plish four purposes: (1) surmounting near well bore damage; (2) creating deep-penetrating fractures
to enhance well productivity; (3) aiding secondary recovery operations; and (4) assisting in the dispo-
sal or injection of salt water or other waste products. GEORGE C. HOWARD & C. ROBERT FAST,
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 8-9 (1970). "Proppants" typically utilized range from natural sand
grains to synthetic proppants, such as intermediate-strength alumina oxide and silica (ceramic) prop-
pants and high-strength bauxite proppants. DETLEF MADER, HYDRAULIC PROPPANT FRACTUR-
ING AND GRAVEL PACKING XXi (1989).
Recently, hydraulic fractures have been utilized to facilitate the recovery of methane from coal
beds. John Chadwick, Coalbed Methane Potential, MINING MAG., July 1991, at 27; S.A. Holditch et
al., Hydraulic Fracturing Accelerates Coalbed Methane Recovery, WORLD OIL, Nov. 1990, at 41.
128. Fracture half lengths (measured from the well bore to the tip of the fracture) typically range
from 2,500 to 4,500 feet for right, low permeability gas reservoirs. MADER, supra note 127, at 633.
See also Bruce A. Matthews et al., Record Massive Hydraulic Fracturing Treatment Pumped in East
Texas Cotton Valley Sands, OIL & GAS J., Oct. 4, 1982, at 94; Sand Prop Holds Open Record Frac in
E. Texas, OIL & GAS J., Jan. 1, 1979, at 78. The orientation of the fracture can be horizontal, like a
pancake, with the well in the middle, for shallower wells, or vertical, for deeper wells; fracture
widths are typically a fraction of an inch, such as 0.1 inches. HOWARD & FAST, supra note 127, at
42-43, 91-94. Fracture lengths can be reasonably estimated by petroleum engineers using pressure
transient analyses of the well. See C. D. Ebinger & Ercill Hunt, Pressure Transient Analysis Key to
Fracs, OIL & GAS J., Apr. 17, 1989, at 39. But cf Horizontal Well Will Be Employed in Hydraulic
Fracturing Research, OIL & GAS J., May 20, 1991, at 45 (theorizing that hydraulic fractures have
shorter lengths than conventional models predict). It is too early to predict whether the recent
horizontal drilling craze will adversely affect the number of hydraulic fractures performed; the two
techniques are not, however, mutually exclusive. But cf Derek A. Reynolds & Ken P. Seymour,
[Vol. 28:311
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From both a functional and physical perspective, a hydraulic frac-
ture is largely analogous to a directionally drilled well. In the subsurface
trespass context, a hydraulic fracture operation creates an artificially
propped crack in the formation that extends into a neighboring lease
much as a well can be directionally drilled into a neighboring lease. In
both situations, oil and gas are produced from beneath a neighboring
lease in a manner not contemplated by the rule of capture. 129 Given that
the only courts to have considered hydraulic fracture subsurface tres-
passes have acknowledged the directional drilling analogy and since
courts in both ownership in place jurisdictions and nonownership juris-
dictions have recognized the tort of directional well subsurface trespass,
it seems likely that these same courts would entertain an action for hy-
draulic fracture subsurface trespass.
Until recently, issues surrounding a hydraulic fracture subsurface
trespass had only been addressed in the Delhi-Taylor cases, four Texas
opinions involving the same plaintiff, Delhi-Taylor, seeking to enjoin off-
setting operators from committing hydraulic fracture subsurface tres-
passes.13 In Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 3 ' Delhi-Taylor owned a
mineral lease adjacent to Gregg's lease. Gregg drilled a gas well only
37.5 feet to the east and 80 feet to the south of Delhi-Taylor's lease and
planned to perform a hydraulic fracture operation to increase productiv-
ity.'3 2 Similarly, in Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Holmes,133 Holmes drilled a
well on his mineral lease, a tract only 30 feet wide, which was bounded
by Delhi-Taylor's leases. As in Gregg, Holmes planned to perform a hy-
draulic fracture operation on the well.134 Gregg and Holmes arrived as
companion cases before the Texas Supreme Court on the issue of whether
the Railroad Commission had primary jurisdiction to hear the cases,
rather than the district courts.1
35
Horizontal Well Replaces Hydraulic Fracturing in North Sea Gas Well, OIL & GAS J., Nov. 25, 1991,
at 71. HOWARD & FASr, supra note 127, at 11-12.
129. The rule of capture was premised upon the notion that an operator should not be held liable
for drawing oil or gas from across lease lines by virtue of production from a well located on the
operator's own lease. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
130. Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 344 S.W.2d 411 (rex. 1961); Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v.
Holmes, 344 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1961); Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Gregg, 337 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1960), aff'd, 344 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. 1961); Holmes v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 337 S.W.2d 479
(Tex. Civ. App. 1960), rev'd, 344 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1961). Collectively, these four opinions will be
referred to as the Delhi-Taylor cases.
131. 344 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. 1961).
132. Id. at 412.
133. 344 S.W.2d 420 (rex. 1961).
134. Id.
135. The courts of appeal had split on the issue. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Gregg, 337 S.W.2d
216 (rex. Civ. App. 1960) (holding that statutory authority of Railroad Commission to require that
wells be drilled and operated in such a manner as to prevent injury to adjacent property did not
1993]
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Holding that an allegation of hydraulic fracture subsurface trespass
is inherently judicial in nature, the court concluded that the courts have
jurisdiction to hear the case:
We think the allegations are sufficient to raise an issue as to
whether there is a trespass. The invasion is direct and the action taken
is intentional. Gregg's well would be, for practical purposes, extended
to and partially completed in Delhi-Taylor's land. The pleadings al-
lege a physical entrance into Delhi-Taylor's leasehold. While the drill-
ing bit of Gregg's well is not alleged to have extended into Delhi-
Taylor's land, the same result is reached if in fact the cracks or veins
extend into its land and gas is produced therefrom by Gregg. To con-
stitute a trespass, "entry upon another's land need not be in person,
but may be made by causing or permitting a thing to cross the bound-
ary of the premises."' 136
For three decades, dicta from the Delhi-Taylor cases stood as the
only reported judicial pronouncement on hydraulic fracture subsurface
trespass. Two recent cases in Texas, however, have revived the viability
of this cause of action. In Geo Viking, Inc. v. Tex-Lee Operating Co.,' 37
Tex-Lee hired Geo Viking to sand frac an 8,000-foot well in the Austin
Chalk. Although the design "propped" half length was 1,000 feet, the
hydraulic fractures extended less than 640 feet due to equipment break-
down during the job. Tex-Lee sued Geo Viking for breach of contract,
and a jury determined that Tex-Lee incurred $300,000 in damages from
Geo Viking's failure to frac the well in a workman-like manner. On ap-
peal, Geo Viking contended, inter alia, that the trial court erred in refus-
ing to include the following limiting instruction to the jury:
divest district court of authority to issue injunction to prevent an injury to property such as a subsur-
face trespass), aff'd, 344 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. 1961); Holmes v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 337 S.W.2d 479
(rex. Civ. App. 1960) (holding that Railroad Commission had primary jurisdiction over all methods
of drilling, completing, and operating oil and gas wells, including hydraulic fracture operations),
rev'd, 344 S.W.2d 420 (rex. 1961). In Gregg, the Texas Supreme Court stated:
The question here is whether the courts of Texas have and will exercise the power to grant
injunctive relief to preserve the status quo upon allegations and proof that a neighbor is
about to fracture an oil or gas producing horizon beyond his property lines for the purpose
of increasing the productivity of the neighbor's well. More broadly, the question is
whether the courts have the power to determine whether a subsurface trespass is occurring
or is about to occur, or whether the Railroad Commission has this power to the exclusion
of the courts, with the courts having the power only to review, under the substantial evi-
dence rule, or otherwise, the action of the Commission.
Gregg, 344 S.W.2d at 412.
136. Holmes v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 344 S.W.2d 411, 416 (Tex. 1961). In so holding, the
court rejected the contention that the "law of capture includes the right to capture by artificial
means or capture by trespass." Id. at 418.
137. 817 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), rev'dpercuriam, No. D-1678, 1992 WL 80263 (Tex.
Apr. 22, 1992), withdrawingper curiam decision and denying writ of error, 839 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Oct.
28, 1992) (per curiam).
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In answering Question No. 5, you shall not consider or include the
value of the oil and gas reserves, if any, outside the 80 acre unit that
would have become recoverable from the White 1 well because of any
fracing beyond the boundaries of such unit. In other words, in esti-
mating the value of such oil and gas reserves, if any, you shall consider
only those reserves that would have become recoverable as a result of
fracing within the boundaries of the lease in question. 138
In the main opinion, the intermediate appellate court noted that Geo
Viking was contending that Tex-Lee had no right to recover oil available
due to a frac extending beyond the unit boundary. Ignoring the implica-
tions of subsurface trespass, the court simply concluded that this argu-
ment ran counter to the rule of capture. 139
On motion for rehearing, a concurring opinion reasoned that "[i]f
Geo Viking is responsible for depriving Tex-Lee of production, it cannot
defend on the basis that Tex-Lee might have secured some of that pro-
duction by trespassing on someone else's land. That is a matter between
Tex-Lee and the other landowner."'" Oddly enough, the author of the
main opinion dissented on the motion for rehearing.1 4 1 Upon reconsider-
ation, this judge agreed with Geo Viking that Tex-Lee's damages for an
improper sandfrac should be limited to "the loss of the oil and gas that
Tex-Lee could legally obtain through that process."' 42 Surmising that
fracing beneath another's land constitutes a subsurface trespass, the dis-
senting judge would have limited Tex-Lee's damages accordingly.143
After granting Geo Viking's application for writ of error, the Texas
Supreme Court released a per curiam opinion reversing the intermediate
court of appeals.' 44 For the first time, the Court directly held that
"[flracing under the surface of another's land constitutes a subsurface
trespass. Therefore, the rule of capture would not permit Tex-Lee to
recover for a loss of oil and gas that might have been produced as the
result of fracing beyond the boundaries of its tract."'' 45 Thus, the trial
court abused its discretion in refusing Geo Viking's limiting instruction.
138. Id. at 365.
139. Id. at 364. ("The remedy of an injured land owner under such circumstances is generally
said to be self-help."). Read broadly, this conclusion implies that there are no restraints on fractur-
ing across lease lines.
140. Id.
141. The main opinion held sway, however, as the dissenting judge could not persuade the other
judges in the panel of three to change their minds. Id. at 364-65.
142. Id. at 365 (emphasis in original).
143. Id. (relying on dictum from Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 344 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. 1961)).
144. Geo Viking, Inc. v. Tex-Lee Operating Co., No. D-1678, 1992 WL 80263, at *1 (Tex. Apr.
22, 1992) (per curiam), withdrawn and writ of error denied per curium, 839 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. 1992).
145. Geo Viking, 1992 WL 80263, at *2 (citations omitted).
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The Court remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of damages. 46
Six months after releasing the foregoing opinion, the Texas Supreme
Court withdrew that opinion and judgment and withdrew the grant of
application for writ of error.1 47 In so doing, the Court let stand the court
of appeals' decision that had been reversed, albeit with questionable prec-
edential value. 148
At the same time the Geo Viking case was making its tortuous pass
through the Texas state courts, a federal district court in Texas was also
considering a case involving a hydraulic fracture subsurface trespass. In
Gifford Operating Co. v. Indrex, Inc., 49 Gifford and Indrex operated
wells on adjacent leases. Indrex first completed the Frye #2-48 well.
After hydraulically fracturing the well, Indrex placed the Frye well on
production at 200 barrels of oil per day and 850 MCF of gas per day. 150
Gifford subsequently completed the Stanley #1-49 well at a location
some 2,640 feet west of the Frye well.'51 Gifford hired Dowell Schlum-
berger Inc. ("DSI") to fracture treat the Stanley well with proppant
designed to extend 2,886 feet from the well. Almost simultaneously with
the fracture treatment of the Stanley well, the Frye well experienced a
decrease in production and died the next day.'52 Frac fluid and proppant
were recovered in the wellbore of the Frye well. By the time Indrex,
through remedial operations, was able to return the Frye well to produc-
tion, the rate had dropped to 50 barrels of oil per day and 190 MCF of
gas per day.15 3
Ironically, Gifford, which also held a working interest in the Frye
well, sued to remove Indrex as operator. Indrex counterclaimed against
Gifford and DSI for negligence and subsurface trespass. The federal dis-
trict court specifically found that Gifford and DSI had designed the frac-
ture treatment of the Stanley well in "deliberate disregard for the lease
lines" and that the fracture had indeed crossed the Frye lease line. 154
146. Id. at *3.
147. Geo Viking, Inc. v. Tex-Lee Operating Co., 839 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam).
148. The court stated that "[i]n denying petitioner's application for writ of error, we should not
be understood as approving or disapproving the opinions of the court of appeals analyzing the rule of
capture or trespass as they apply to hydraulic fracturing." Id. at 798.
149. Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law No. 2:89-CV-0189 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 7,
1992). None of the parties in the Gifford case chose to perfect an appeal on the merits from the
decision of the district court. The reader should note that the author's law firm represented Indrex
in Gifford but that the decision was rendered prior to the time the author joined the firm.
150. Id. at 6-7. According to a fracturing model, the fracture on the Frye well extended 1,324
feet in propped frac length. The Frye well was located 1319 feet from the closest lease line. Id.
151. Id. at 7. The Stanley well was located 1329 feet from the nearest lease line. Id.
152. A well which ceases to produce for any reason is said to have "died."
153. Gifford, No. 2:89-CV-0189, slip. op. at 10.
154. Id. at 11.
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The court relied on the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in Geo Viking,
which had not yet been withdrawn, as authority for the proposition that
"sand fracturing across lease lines amounts to subsurface trespass." 155
Thus, the court held Gifford and DSI liable for subsurface trespass.156
Geo Viking and Gifford Operating are important cases for several
reasons. First, Gifford Operating stands as the only decision directly
holding that a hydraulic fracture across lease lines constitutes a subsur-
face trespass. While dicta in the Delhi-Taylor cases support Gifford Op-
erating, the withdrawal of the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in Geo
Viking leaves the intermediate appellate opinion in Geo Viking somewhat
at odds with Gifford Operating.1 57 Second, both Geo Viking and Gifford
Operating permitted recovery from the service companies performing the
hydraulic fracture operations. Therefore, the protections seemingly af-
forded to service companies in Schlumberger as to conspiracy actions
may not extend to subsurface trespass actions.1 58
While the foregoing Texas cases establish the viability of a cause of
action for hydraulic fracture subsurface trespass, many issues remain un-
resolved. For example, will nonownership jurisdictions recognize the
subsurface trespass cause of action in the hydraulic fracture context as in
the directional well context? 59 May even a royalty interest owner main-
tain a cause of action?" ° Will establishing to a preponderance that a
hydraulic fracture subsurface trespass indeed occurred prove insur-
mountable? 161 Will courts revise the damage calculus to account for the
155. Id. at 13-14.
156. Id. at 15. In so holding, the court expressly rejected DSI's contention that "sand fracturing
across lease lines is not an actionable trespass because of a public policy to prevent waste." Id. at 14
(citing Amarillo Oil Co. v. Energy-Agri Prod., 794 S.W.2d 20, 27 (rex. 1990)).
157. Note that the Texas Supreme Court withdrew its opinion in Geo Viking after the expiration
of the period to file an appeal in Gifford Operating.
158. For a discussion of Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp. v. Nortex Oil & Gas Corp., 435
S.W.2d 854 (Tex. 1968), see supra notes 61-75 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 76-117 and accompanying text for a discussion of directional well subsur-
face trespass in nonownership jurisdictions.
160. Compare Edwards v. Lachman, 534 P.2d 670, 672 (Okla. 1974) (Lachman I1) (permitting a
royalty owner to maintain a cause of action for directional well subsurface trespass) with Note, supra
note 18, at 666 ("[Ihe [directional well subsurface] trespass action is limited to parties in possession;
therefore [the operator lessee] is the only party entitled to bring an action for trespass since only [the
lessor's] land has suffered a physical intrusion and [the lessee] has the exclusive right to possession by
virtue of the lease from [the lessor].").
161. In the directional well subsurface trespass context, surveying instruments can establish to a
near certainty the precise bottom hole location of a well bore. Under present petroleum engineering
technology, the direction of a hydraulic fracture cannot ordinarily be estimated. The length of the
fracture can, however, be estimated using established empirical equations. In the Delhi-Taylor cases,
the defendants' wells were so close to the boundary lines that little doubt existed that hydraulic
fractures would have extended into plaintiffs' subsurface. In Gifford Operating, the hydraulic frac-
ture extended directly into an adjacent well. In the typical hydraulic subsurface trespass, the proof
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unique nature of a hydraulic fracture subsurface trespass? '62 Will the
public policy of fostering techniques to enhance oil and gas production
make courts reluctant to put a roadblock in the path of operators seeking
to perform hydraulic fracturing operations?' 63
B. Other Theories
1. Conversion
In addition to the tort of subsurface trespass, plaintiffs have pursued
relief under a conversion theory for a subsurface entry by an adjacent
landowner.'" In the directional well subsurface entry context, courts
have permitted the aggrieved landowner to recover conversion damages
for oil and gas produced from the trespassing well.' 65  The good faith,
may be more elusive. This determination is obviously factual in nature and should ordinarily be
determined by the trier of fact based on the testimony of expert petroleum engineers.
162. The good faith, bad faith dichotomy ordinarily determines the damage calculus for the tort
of subsurface trespass. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text. This makes sense for a direc-
tional well subsurface trespass, where all of the oil and gas are produced into the well bore from
beneath the aggrieved landowner's land. In a hydraulic fracture subsurface trespass, however, hy-
drocarbons enter the fracture both from beneath the aggrieved landowner's lease and the trespasser's
lease. Expert petroleum engineers ostensibly could estimate the contribution from each lease. In
fact, the Texas Supreme Court's withdrawn opinion in Geo Viking contemplated precisely this limi-
tation on Tex-Lee's damage recovery. The Oklahoma Supreme Court may have foreclosed such an
argument. Edwards v. Lachman, 534 P.2d 670, 676 (Okla. 1974) (rejecting Lachman's contention
that in calculating damages the rule of capture should be displaced by the ownership in place rule for
an innocent trespass). See supra note 100. Also, the question remains whether a court will be as
willing to enjoin production from a hydraulic fracture subsurface trespassing well given that only a
fraction of the production comes from the adjacent lease via the fracture.
163. As seen in the injected fluids subsurface trespass context, the public policy of encouraging
enhanced recovery operations prompted some courts to alter the damage calculus. See supra notes
121-122 and accompanying text. Given that many tight gas sands would not produce economically
in the absence of lengthy hydraulic fractures, it is possible that a court may similarly disfavor a cause
of action for hydraulic fracture subsurface trespass. For instance, a court could limit damages to the
incremental production from the trespassing well that is facilitated by the portion of the fracture that
extends into the offsetting lease as discussed in supra note 162. Note, however, that the court in
Gifford Operating rejected the argument that the public policy to prevent waste insulates a party
from liability for hydraulic fracture subsurface trespass. See supra note 156.
164. See generally PROSSER, supra note 20, § 15; Note, supra note 18, at 666 & n.6 ("Trover is
the technical name of the cause of action used to recover damages for a conversion of personal
property of another, conversion being the intentional, unauthorized assumption of the right of own-
ership over that personal property."); Allen H. Barr, Comment, Oil and Gas: Liability and Damagesfor Underground Trespasses, 27 CAL. L. REv. 192, 194 (1939). Although conversion actions have
traditionally been limited to parties in or entitled to possession, California courts have extended a
conversion cause of action to even nonpossessory interest owners on the theory that the important
interest to be protected is the ownership interest, not merely possession. PROSSER, supra note 20,
§ 15; Note, supra note 18, at 666-68.
165. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Long, 340 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied sub nom.
Southwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 381 U.S. 926 (1965); Harrington v. Texaco,
Inc., 339 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1964), cert denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965); Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v.
Orr, 319 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1963); First Nat'l Bank v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 709 S.W.2d 4 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1986). In Long, the Fifth Circuit stated:
Conversion is "... the unlawful and wrongful exercise of dominion, ownership, or control
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bad faith dichotomy used to determine subsurface trespass damages ap-
plies in the conversion context as well. 166 The list of potential defendants
in a conversion action may exceed that for subsurface trespass, extending
beyond those directly involved in the subsurface entrance.167 The statute
of limitations for a conversion action typically begins to run from the
time of the conversion, unless there has been a fraudulent
concealment. 168
2. Private Nuisance
Another potential cause of action for a subsurface entry is the pri-
vate nuisance. A private nuisance has been defined as "a substantial and
unreasonable interference with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his
real property." 169 While plaintiffs have often pursued a nuisance cause of
by one person over the property of another, to the exclusion of the same rights by the
owner, ... "
... Although the act of control or dominion must be positive and affirmative . . ., a
wrongful or fraudulent intent or purpose is not required, and the presence of good faith in
the converter is relevant only on the issue of damages.
Long, 340 F.2d at 219-20 (citations and footnotes omitted).
166. E.g., Harrington, 339 F.2d at 821 & n.16. See generally SUMMERS, supra note 26, § 24, at
54-60. For a discussion of the good faith and bad faith measure of damages in the context of subsur-
face trespass, see supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
167. E.g., Long, 340 F.2d at 221 (permitting victim of directional well subsurface trespass to
recover under conversion theory against the financial institution that loaned money to the trespasser
and who received mortgage payments directly from the pipeline company. The Fifth Circuit found
that, while the financial institution did not physically receive the oil, it did exert sufficient control
over the property (i.e., more extensive than mere creditor-debtor relation) so as to be liable for
conversion. Id.
168. Long, 340 F.2d at 213-14 (holding that statute of limitations was tolled only as to the
fraudulent concealing subsurface trespasser, not as to the financial institution also liable for conver-
sion); Orr, 319 F.2d at 613 (holding that the conversion statute of limitations is tolled where defend-
ant has fraudulently concealed the cause of action but requiring plaintiff to act with reasonable
diligence to discover the fraud after being put on inquiry); First Nat'l Bank, 709 S.W.2d at 7. See
generally KuNTz, supra note 41, § 11.10.
169. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 228 (comparing trespass and private nuisance law). Professor
Reynolds discussed trespass and private nuisance as follows:
Clearly an unauthorized use or other invasion of my neighbor's real property may
disturb not only his interest in possession, creating trespass liability, but may also simulta-
neously disturb his use and enjoyment of that property, causing nuisance liability. There-
fore, the torts of trespass and nuisance are not mutually ex-clusive and may coexist in the
same set of facts....
The fundamental distinction between trespass and nuisance, underlying such other
distinctions as the requirements that a trespass be tangible and visible, is the definitional
idea of trespass as an invasion of possessory interests in real property and of nuisance as an
invasion of the use and enjoyment of land, with possibly some incidental harm to posses-
sory interests.... The one tort damages the property itself; the other damages the posses-
sor's use thereof. Of course, the same conduct may damage both the property and its use.
Reynolds, supra note 2, at 229, 234.
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action in the context of injected fluids subsurface entries,1 70 research
yielded no case law in the context of a directional well subsurface en-
trance, presumably because the directional well subsurface entrance ordi-
narily would not substantially interfere with the plaintiff's use and
enjoyment. In the context of a hydraulic fracture subsurface entrance, a
private nuisance action should not ordinarily obtain because the nature
of the intrusion is far less likely to interfere with the adjacent owner's use
and enjoyment than is the intrusion from saltwater injection or water-
flood. Again, the nature of the intrusion in a hydraulic fracture is more
like that of a directional drilling well.
3. Negligence
Finally, the victim of a subsurface entry presumably could maintain
a cause of action for negligence.' In fact, the court in Gifford Operating
expressly held that Gifford and DSI were liable for negligent design and
execution of the fracture treatment of the Stanley well, in addition to
liability for subsurface trespass.172 Perhaps the reason that plaintiffs
have typically chosen to pursue trespass causes of action instead is to
avoid having to establish the unreasonableness of defendants'
operations. 173
IV. CONCLUSION
With the advent of deep-penetrating, hydraulic fracturing opera-
tions in the past decade, primarily in tight gas reservoirs, the potential
170. E.g., Mowrer v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 518 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that defend-
ant oil company was liable under a private nuisance theory for oil seepage onto plaintiff's land near a
capped well caused by defendant's authorized, non-negligent waterflood operation); Greyhound
Leasing & Fin. Corp. v. Joiner City Unit, 444 F.2d 439 (10th Cir. 1971) (holding that defendant
waterflood unit operator was liable for private nuisance damages [fair market differential] arising
from the flooding of plaintiff's leases outside of the authorized waterflood); Boyce v. Dundee Heald-
ton Sand Unit, 560 P.2d 234 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Hughes, 371 P.2d 81 (Okla.
1962) (holding that defendant waterflood operator was liable for private nuisance, even in absence of
negligence, where injected salt water invaded fresh water zones on plaintiff's land; the damage
formula was the fair market value differential for permanent injury to the fresh water supply, or the
cost of a replacement fresh water well for non-permanent injury).
171. In fact, one commentator has suggested that "[i]f an interference with any rights of either
possession or use of property is unintentional, negligence is the appropriate theory of recovery....
requiring application of a reasonableness standard." Reynolds, supra note 2, at 230 (citation
omitted).
172. Gifford Operating Co. v. Indrex, Inc., No. 2:89-CV-0189, slip. op. at 11-12 (N.D. Tex. Aug.
7, 1992). For a discussion of Gifford Operating, see supra notes 149-156 and accompanying text.
173. Cf Texon Drilling Co. v. Elliff, 216 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) (awarding conver-
sion damages for injury to personalty, rather than fair market value differential for injury to realty,
where defendant negligently drilled well, resulting in blowout that drained oil and gas from beneath
plaintiff's land and eventually cratered wells on plaintiff's land), on remand from Elliff v. Texon
Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558 (rex. 1948).
36
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 28 [1992], Iss. 3, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol28/iss3/1
1993] STEALTHY SUBSURFACE TRESPASS 347
for an operator to effect a subsurface entry into an adjacent lease is am-
plified. In the event that a hydraulic fracture subsurface entrance does
occur, the aggrieved owner is likely to pursue a cause of action for sub-
surface trespass, regardless of whether situated in an ownership in place
jurisdiction or a nonownership jurisdiction. The measure of damages
will likely depend on the good faith (or bad faith) of the trespasser but
may be significantly more difficult to prove than in cases for directional
well subsurface trespass because of difficulties in proving what, if any,
portion of the increased production is attributable to the trespass. Sub-
surface trespass liability may extend beyond the operator of the trespass-
ing well to service companies actively participating in the hydraulic
fracture operation, although little case law exists on the issue. The ag-
grieved landowner may also seek to enjoin production from the trespass-
ing well. Additionally, the aggrieved owner may pursue a cause of action
under the following theories, in order of decreasing preference: (1) con-
version; (2) private nuisance; (3) negligence.
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